

May 22, 2017

On Saturday, May 20, 2017, Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Rod Rosenstein called my cell phone [REDACTED] at approximately 10:15 am. He asked if I was working and, if so, if I could meet him and Special Counsel (SC) Robert Mueller at 1:00 pm. I indicated that I was not working and that I was busy. I asked if we could meet on Sunday morning. He offered to check SC Mueller's availability for Sunday. While still on the phone with me, he called "Bob" on another phone and asked if Bob could meet Sunday. I assumed he was speaking to the SC. We agreed to meet at DOJ at 11:00 am on Sunday. The DAG informed me that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss "coordination and logistics issues."

On Sunday, May 21, 2017, I met with the DAG, the SC, Aaron Zebley and FBI EAD Carl Ghattas (who attended at my request). We convened in the DAG's conference room. The DAG opened the meeting by thanking me for the work I was doing, and stating that he continued to support my staying in the position of Acting FBI Director. I assumed he meant until the permanent Director is selected. He then stated that he had the highest regard for my integrity, and that he had read and agreed with the memorandum written by FBI Assistant Director Patrick Kelley addressing the issue of whether or not there were any conflict issues with my involvement in the Russia investigation. He stated that he did not believe I had a conflicts with the Russia investigation. Despite this, he then stated that he thought I should consider recusing myself from the investigation. He said he was not ordering me to recuse, but merely suggesting that I consider it in order to ensure the credibility of the investigation. He then stated that in the past I have maintained that I did not play a role in my wife Dr. Jill McCabe's 2015 run for Virginia State senate, but noted that there was a photograph on the internet of us wearing campaign t-shirts. He stated that this potential "credibility issue" could cause some people to complain about my involvement in the investigation.

I reminded him that the photograph he referenced did not in any way contradict my statement of not having played a role in my wife's campaign and not attending any campaign events. The photograph was not evidence of proscribed political activity, but rather a photograph taken at [REDACTED]. I offered to explain the entire matter to the SC and to provide him with a copy of AD Kelley's memo, which concludes that there is no basis in law or in fact that would establish a conflict, the appearance of a conflict, or call for my recusal from the Russia matter.

SC Mueller said he did not want to be briefed on the matter or review the memo. He thought the issue might be beyond the scope of his authority as SC. He asked EAD Ghattas and me to leave the room briefly so he could talk to the DAG privately. We left.

A few minutes later we reentered the room. SC Mueller stated that he would not weigh in on the recusal issue, but he wanted to let me know that he thought I would likely be a witness in the investigation. I told the DAG that I did not believe he was in a position to order me, or anyone, to recuse from the Russia investigation, in light of his appointment of the Special Counsel. He repeated that he was not ordering me to recuse, but was rather suggesting that I consider it. I told him I would discuss it with FBI counsel and get back to him at a later date.

We ended the meeting at approximately 1130. There was no discussion of any "coordination and logistics issues". I left DOJ with EAD Ghattas and returned to FBI HQ.

[REDACTED]

(U/[REDACTED]) On May 16, 2017, Acting Director McCabe and I met with the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Rod Rosenstein in his office at the Department of Justice. Also present were Jim Crowell, Scott Schools, Tashina Gauhar, and Stuart Goldberg. We did not know the topic of the meeting in advance of our arrival, only that he had called earlier in the afternoon and asked if the Acting Director could meet at 7:30 that evening.

(U/[REDACTED]) When we entered his office the DAG was in the middle of recounting for Scott Schools and Stuart Goldberg the events leading up to Director Comey's firing. The DAG interrupted his story, told them that he would return to it, then turned to the Acting Director and told him that he already knew all of this, that he was just bringing Scott and Stuart up to speed. About his meeting at the White House before the Director's firing (which may have been what he had just been describing), he stated that "a lot of this feels stage-managed." He didn't explain further what he meant.

(U/[REDACTED]) The DAG then shifted into a chaotic discussion about his view that getting a good FBI Director nominated was his most important priority. It was chaotic because he frequently shifted between recounting conversations he had had with possible nominees, while at the same time referring to some of the same individuals as the possible Special Counsel over the Russia investigation. Among those individuals he listed as being under consideration for permanent Director of the FBI were Mark Philip, Robert Mueller, Paul Abbate, and Adam Lee. He said that Alice Fisher had withdrawn herself from consideration. The DAG said he began making calls to Mueller and Philip on Wednesday, after figuring out on Tuesday night that "something was dramatically wrong." He explained that Mueller had called and said he would do it (it appeared that this was a reference to the Special Counsel job, but the conversation was so disjointed that Mr. McCabe and I did not truly learn that Mr. Mueller would be so appointed until the DAG informed us on the day of the "Gang of 8" briefing on May 17, 2016).

(U/[REDACTED]) During the course of this conversation the DAG also mentioned former DAG Jim Cole as an individual who would be willing to serve as Special Counsel, and stated that Cole could start within 24 hour notice. (The DAG returned to this topic repeatedly; for ease of reading, I have included all information related to the appointment of a Special Counsel in this paragraph, even if it came later in the conversation). The DAG further explained that while he was committed to appointing a Special Counsel, it was an issue of timing, because he believed he would be fired as soon as one was appointed. He stressed that didn't think it would be in the best interest of the Department of Justice or the AG to not have a DAG or Acting AG.

(U/[REDACTED]) The DAG then interrupted himself to talk about the Acting Director's "political problem," referring to the claim that the Acting Director should have recused himself from the Hillary Clinton email investigation as a result of his wife having run for a Virginia State Senate seat in 2015. The DAG mentioned as an aside that Senator Grassley was "all over" Mr. McCabe and that the President's draft letter (described in more detail later in this memo) stated that allowing Mr. McCabe to remain on as Deputy was one of the reasons that Director Comey was being fired. The DAG raised with the Acting Director a photograph that had been taken off the Internet that showed the Acting Director and his wife

[REDACTED]

wearing "Jill McCabe for State Senate" t-shirts, and stated this was evidence that the Acting Director had engaged in prohibited political activity. (The DAG had raised this issue with Mr. McCabe on several prior occasions). The Acting Director explained again that he wore that t-shirt [REDACTED], and that regardless, wearing a t-shirt or political button does not constitute proscribed political activity.

(U/[REDACTED] The DAG then returned to the topic of the appointment of a permanent FBI Director, and stated that the President had suggested that current DHS Secretary John Kelly serve as FBI Director, which the DAG viewed as a "disruption strategy." (It was not clear whether the DAG was referring to the permanent Director position, or someone to hold the position as interim Director; the DAG's conversational style was quite frenetic and jumped a great deal from topic to topic without warning). The DAG expressed that he thought this plan didn't make any sense, that Secretary Kelly wasn't going to leave a Cabinet-level position to become Director of the FBI, and that additionally, Secretary Kelly didn't have the experience to be the Director. He said that either the President or Secretary Kelly (it wasn't clear to whom he was referring) seemed to think that perhaps Secretary Kelly could do both jobs at once, to which the DAG responded again that this was all a "disruption strategy."

(U/[REDACTED] The DAG said he had concern about what was going on at the White House, unrelated to the nomination of FBI Director, but didn't expand further.

(U/[REDACTED] With respect to current contenders for permanent Director, the DAG indicated that there were two problems with selecting Bob Mueller: that his firm represents Manafort, and that the law would need to be changed as he had already served a term as FBI Director. The DAG stated they were scrambling to find a new Director, but that he didn't believe that Paul Abbate or Adam Lee (both current agents, serving in positions of executive management at the FBI) were qualified. He said they were great agents and supervisors, but were not right for Director. He again mentioned reaching out for Mark Philip, and said that former Attorney General Michael Mukasey planned to call him.

(U/[REDACTED] The DAG then described some of the actual interviews that the President had conducted for FBI Director. The DAG said that the individuals present for them were the President, Vice President, Attorney General Sessions, Jody Hunt (Chief of Staff to the AG), and himself. (Additional personnel may have been present as well). The DAG said that Mueller had been interviewed recently, but that his interview had been relatively brief. The DAG described the Lee and Abbate interviews in much the same way, saying that the President asked very superficial questions, ("So, would you like the job?" and "It's really good for you that you're here, right?" which the DAG described as a reference to it being "good press" for them) and appeared ready to end the interviews. The DAG said he took over both interviews, because he was concerned that both candidates would leave the interview thinking, "This is it? This is the interview for Director of the FBI?" (The DAG then interjected that the Acting Director should have Abbate and Lee write up 302s of their interviews so that there was a record of them). The DAG believed that there would be a negative impact on the FBI for the President to nominate an SAC to head the organization, and further said that the Vice President and Attorney General "get it." The DAG reiterated that Mueller was the only individual who was qualified, and that he told the President that nominating a current agent wasn't only "rare" (as had been characterized by the President), but was unprecedented. The DAG mentioned that the President tried to get Mr. Abbate to say that the Bureau had been in chaos last year, and ended this topic by saying that he had recruited Rick McFeely (a former FBI agent) who was scheduled to be interviewed the following day, and that the President was very interested in Joe Lieberman for the position. (In the middle of this conversation the

[REDACTED]

DAG interrupted himself to describe an odd series of events in which he was helping Bob Mueller locate his phone, which he had misplaced somewhere at the White House, and that Dina Powell offered to help him with "this FBI thing." No additional relevant information was conveyed, though the story went on for some time). At the end of our meeting (but still related to this topic), the DAG called McGahn while in our presence, who confirmed that the President planned to interview McCabe, Philip, and McFeely, but that he was currently fascinated by Lieberman.

(U/[REDACTED] The DAG then turned to Jim Crowell and asked, "Should I tell the phone call story?" He described the events of "Tuesday afternoon [the day Director Comey was fired], when I start[ed] to get the clue that they are firing by email." He said the Department's public affairs office reached out to him and told him that the White House wanted to say that the firing was the DAG's idea. The DAG said he responded, "Sarah, this is the U.S. Department of Justice, they can do whatever they want, but we're not going to put out a false statement." After the firing, the DAG said that the President had called his cell phone and told the DAG that he was watching Fox News and that the reporting was saying that it was great, that Rupert Murdoch was saying it was great, amazing. The DAG says he reiterated that if they asked him who came up with the idea, I'm going to tell them. The DAG said that his press person, Sarah, received several screaming phone calls from Reince Priebus, Chief of Staff to the President, and there were several back and forth conversations about the "tick tock," in essence, the timeline of events leading up to Director Comey's firing. (Author's note: The DAG then mentioned "Pence was there, he knew to come" which I believe refers to at the original meeting when they discussed firing Director Comey, and not during the timeline discussions). The DAG explained he knew he was getting "blasted" but that he was unwilling to say that it was his idea to fire the Director, which was what the White House wanted.

The DAG then turned to the events surrounding the Director's firing. He said that he had been called to the White House in the evening on Monday, May 8th, by the President. Once there, the DAG stated that Don McGahn, the White House Counsel, informed him that the President had written a letter enumerating the bases for the Director's firing, but that McGahn was trying to convince the President not to send it. The DAG said he was led to the Oval Office by McGahn, and present there was the President, the Vice President, AG Sessions, Jody Hunt, McGahn, and possibly others. The DAG said it was hard to reduce what happened to a couple of sentences, but said that they had decided to fire Jim Comey before they told me, but that they were "acting like they cared about my opinion." (Author's note: This was a strange comment because it was my understanding that the DAG had previously indicated that he and AG Sessions had been discussing firing Director Comey since January, but given the nature of the conversation there was no room for follow-up). The DAG was provided a copy of the President's letter, and publicly agreed with McGahn that the President should not send it. (Around this time the DAG also informed us that he had the President's letter, and told us that he would provide it to us upon our departure, which he did). Upon our return to HQ, I made one copy of the letter, Mr. McCabe put it in an envelope, sealed and signed it, and placed it in his safe).

(U/[REDACTED] The DAG then indicated that the President asked him to write a memo explaining the loss of confidence he had in Director Comey's continued ability to lead the FBI. The DAG stated that the White House didn't tell him what to put in the memo, but then later stated that the President had specifically requested that he mention "Russia" as a reason that the DAG had lost confidence. The DAG said that he had concerns about Comey, but that Russia was not a part of those concerns and so he

[REDACTED]

refused. He said the President he would "appreciate it if you put Russia in." The DAG also said that the President asked him to include the fact that Comey had told him three times that he wasn't under investigation, but the DAG said to us that he refused to put that in the memo because he wasn't sure if it was a true statement. Finally, the DAG also indicated that it hadn't occurred to him that the letter would be released. The DAG explained that once written his memo and AG Sessions' recommendation were delivered to the White House on Tuesday by Jody Hunt, the AG's Chief of Staff, and that he spent two hours in the Oval Office with the President planning how to coordinate the firing.

(U// [REDACTED])¹ At some point during the DAG's description of the Director's firing, the Acting Director informed the room that the FBI had decided to open an investigation against the President, as well as AG Sessions. The Acting Director also informed the group that the FBI had made arrangements to brief the Gang of 8 the following evening. The DAG indicated that he wanted to attend, which launched a conversation in which several of us implored the DAG that he should make the announcement of his intention to appoint a Special Counsel *before* he attended the Gang of 8 briefing, or the All-Member briefs scheduled for that Thursday and Friday. The DAG initially resisted, saying that he only wanted to tell the Gang of 8 that he was taking appropriate steps, and that he had reason to believe that Senator Schumer would trust him. Stuart Goldberg then asked a number of probing questions about why the FBI had decided to open the investigation, and said that we would have to explain what had changed between the last time Director Comey had stated that he wasn't under investigation and the decision to open. (We had already explained in depth what we thought had changed, and the various facts we relied on as predication to open the investigation).

(U// [REDACTED]) Near the end of the meeting, the DAG returned to several topics which had been previously discussed, including the controversy surrounding Mr. McCabe (this time raising the "Circa News" story, which reported that Mr. McCabe had high-fived when Lt. Gen. Flynn was fired and said pejorative things about President Trump. Mr. McCabe and I tried to explain how resoundingly this had been discounted, given the number of people who were purportedly in the room when it occurred, but the DAG explained he just wanted us to know what people told him about Mr. McCabe. He also mentioned that the President had asked Adam Lee whether or not he was a Republican, and in reference to Mr. McCabe's upcoming interview with President Trump (which had not been scheduled and for which Mr. McCabe had no awareness) inexplicably yelled, "Do you think this is a real interview?!" and suggested that he and Mr. McCabe should wear a wire to record the conversation.

(U// [REDACTED]) We left the meeting at 9:10 pm, everyone else remained in the room with the DAG.

Lisa Page

¹ Author's note: I am marking this paragraph [REDACTED] because at the time of this writing, the existence of the case against the President and AG Sessions is still classified. During the course of the conversation with the DAG, however, he paused at one point and turned to Tashina Gauhar to ask about the classification level of the meeting, which he assumed would be "TS." She offhandedly said, "yes" which caused me to raise the concern that while the discussion we were having was sensitive, that I didn't believe that disclosure of this meeting could be fairly characterized to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security, and something being sensitive or potentially embarrassing was not a basis to classify the contents of a meeting. As such, I believe the appropriate classification of most of this memo is U// [REDACTED]

TAB 10

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 12/19/2016**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] OHR met STEELE [REDACTED] in 2007, sometime before a January 2008 conference they both attended. OHR remembers he was at a conference when Simeon Mogilevich was arrested in Russia in January 2008 and their first interaction took place prior to that event. As the Chief of DOJ's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at the time, OHR met STEELE [REDACTED] in London FGI [REDACTED]. STEELE [REDACTED] was an expert on Russia, specifically Russian organized crime, and was concerned the west was not taking the Russian threat seriously. Russian oligarchs are brilliant yet cold-blooded and do not act like adults as they kill people for nothing. Over the years OHR and STEELE [REDACTED] had a few more meetings before OHR FGI [REDACTED] and joined or founded Orbis. FGI [REDACTED] OHR and STEELE [REDACTED] would see each other once a year in London or the U.S. STEELE [REDACTED] had paid clients, yet provided OHR with the same short intel reports from a variety of subsources that were well placed. OHR introduced STEELE [REDACTED] to his eventual handler, SA Michael Gaeta from the FBI's New York Field office.

[REDACTED] OHR believes that STEELE [REDACTED] kept his sources FGI [REDACTED] OHR does not know if STEELE [REDACTED] kept the sources but there was a strong context that he/she did keep the sources and that is what OHR drew from it.

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 11/22/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747Date drafted 11/22/2016by Joe Pientka III

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 11/22/2016, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED] OHR believes Russian oligarchs will provide information to the FBI because in Russia everyone talks to the police. Following the 2014 Ukrainian invasion OHR met with Gaeta and STEELE [REDACTED] in Rome. OHR recalled the three talked about engaging with prospective oligarchs, and that meeting led to a meeting between the FBI, Paul Hauser and Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska in New York.

(U [REDACTED]) In the 2011 timeframe, STEELE [REDACTED] introduced the FBI to the source that predicated the FIFA case. The source may not have been the source who initiated the case, but contributed to the start of the case.

[REDACTED] In late July 2016, possibly Saturday, July 30, 2016, STEELE [REDACTED] called OHR and asked to meet for breakfast as he/she was in Washington, D.C. and had some serious stuff to talk about. STEELE [REDACTED] planned to also tell SA Gaeta about the information he/she had collected. OHR met STEELE [REDACTED] for breakfast where OHR was told that Carter Page had met with high level officials in Russia. Page met with Sechin and one other person. The media had already documented Page's trip to Moscow at that time. The FSB had Trump over a barrel according to a high level Russian official who advised former SVR Director Vyacheslav Trubnikov who reported to STEELE [REDACTED]. In addition, Oleg Deripaska was furious at Paul Manafort and was making a case against him. Deripaska and Hauser were almost ready to talk to the U.S. about the money Paul Manafort stole. STEELE [REDACTED] claimed he had already given some of this reporting to SA Gaeta and planned to give the rest to him. At that time, STEELE [REDACTED] had provided Gaeta with two reports regarding these topics while Glen Simpson had four. OHR provided copies of notes he took during and after the meeting with STEELE [REDACTED] which are enclosed as attachments.

[REDACTED] OHR knew Glen Simpson hired STEELE [REDACTED] to dig up Trump's connections to Russia. OHR's wife is a Russian translator and was hired to conduct open source research. Even though she did not know the goal of the project, she was able to surmise the purpose as the individuals she was researching were close to Trump. OHR knew that Glen Simpson was hired by a lawyer who does opposition research. OHR knew STEELE [REDACTED]'s reporting on Trump's ties to Russia were going to the Clinton Campaign, Jon Winer at the U.S. State Department and the FBI. OHR was aware that Simpson was passing STEELE [REDACTED]'s information to many individuals or entities and at times STEELE [REDACTED] would attend meetings with Simpson.

[REDACTED] OHR met STEELE [REDACTED] in Washington, D.C. in late September, possibly close to the time when the Yahoo news article was published on September 23, 2016. During that meeting, STEELE [REDACTED] advised the Alfa server in the US is a link to the Trump campaign and Sergei Millian's Russian/American organization in the U.S. used the Alfa server two weeks

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 11/22/2016, Page 3 of 3

prior. Sergei Yatsenko is alleged to be an Intelligence Officer working with Carter Page. STEELE was desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passionate about him not being the U.S. President. OHR believes STEELE wanted to blunt or foil the Kremlin's plans. Simpson and STEELE could have met with Yahoo or Michael Isikoff jointly, but OHR does not know if they did. OHR provided copies of notes he took after the meeting with STEELE which are enclosed as attachments.

[REDACTED] OHR never believed STEELE was making up information or shading it. He/she would say this is what sources are telling me. There are always Russian conspiracy theories that come from the Kremlin. One time OHR heard a theory from STEELE regarding Mikhail Lesin's death that came from the Kremlin. STEELE reported that Lesin was beaten to teach him a lesson but it got out of hand and he died. OHR honestly believes STEELE reported what he heard from sources at the Kremlin but that doesn't make that story true.

[REDACTED] Jon Winer possibly knew STEELE FGI [REDACTED] OHR met Winer in 1999 or 2000 when Winer was the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law Enforcement. Winer was very interested in Russian Organized Crime and enthusiastic about the subject, yet at times difficult to deal with. OHR knew Glen Simpson and others were talking to Victoria Nuland at the U.S. State Department.

[REDACTED] OHR does not know how STEELE handles or communicates with his/her sub-sources. OHR does not know the identity of STEELE's sub-sources.

[REDACTED] OHR provided the following contact information for STEELE STEELE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 12/19/2016**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] OHR has never met the business partner of STEELE [REDACTED]. On one occasion, OHR met with STEELE [REDACTED] and the CHS brought a tall, young, male associate, but it was not the CHS' business partner.

[REDACTED] OHR does not know what STEELE [REDACTED]'s spouse's position FGI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OHR has never been present during meetings between STEELE [REDACTED] and Jon Winer. OHR is only aware that STEELE [REDACTED] and Winer have met as STEELE [REDACTED] advises OHR that the meetings occur.

[REDACTED] Glen Simpson directed STEELE [REDACTED] to speak to the press as that was what Simpson was paying STEELE [REDACTED] to do. OHR does not know if STEELE [REDACTED] going to Mother Jones was Simpson's idea or not.

[REDACTED] Glen Simpson hired OHR's wife to conduct research for his firm. OHR will voluntarily provide his wife's research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with a report on Paul Manafort. The report titled, "Manafort Chronology", was scanned and is a digital attachment to this document.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** 20411231
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/05/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747 Date drafted 12/12/2016by Joe Pientka III

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[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 12/05/2016, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 12/19/2016**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] OHR had breakfast at Peet's Coffee, 11th and E St. NW, Washington, D.C. with Glenn Simpson at 10:00 A.M. on December 10, 2016. During breakfast Simpson provided OHR with an 8GB Verbatim USB micro digital media drive (thumb drive). OHR does not know what is on the thumb drive but believes it is in regards to the work [REDACTED] STEELE was hired to do for Simpson. The thumb drive was entered into evidence at WFO as original evidence (bar code # E5518001) and a working copy CD-ROM was produced for investigative use. An evidence FD-302 was generated and serialized to this file.

[REDACTED] OHR took notes after the meeting with Simpson to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

[REDACTED] Simpson identified Michael Cohen, a lawyer in Brooklyn, NY as having many Russian clients in the Brighton Beach, NY area. Cohen is the go-between Russia and the Trump Campaign and replaced Paul Manafort and Carter Page. Cohen's wife's last name is Shusterman and her father is a major real-estate developer in Moscow with ties to the Kremlin. Cohen may have attended a meeting in Prague, possibly in September, regarding the Trump Campaign and the Russians.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/12/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 12/14/2016by Joe Pientka III

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 12/12/2016, Page 2 of 3

[REDACTED] According to Simpson, much of his collection about the Trump campaign ties to Russia comes from a former Russian Intelligence officer who lives in the U.S. Simpson does not know his name.

[REDACTED] A former Trump campaign official, possibly Rick Wilson, was talking about some of the Trump ties to Russia and the Trump Campaign tried to sue him for violating his non-disclosure agreement.

[REDACTED] A Russian senator and mobster named Torshin may be involved in running the Central Bank of Russia. Torshin's name comes up in in Law Enforcement Organized Crime circles as he is well known in a famous Spanish case that shows direct linkages between Russian Organized Crime, Torshin and the Russian Government. Torshin may have funneled Russian money to the National Rifle Association (NRA) to use in support of Trump. An NRA lawyer, Cleta Mitchell, found out about the money pipeline and was very upset, but the election was over by the time she learned of it. Simpson stated there are pictures of Torshin with Trump. Simpson provided OHR with an article on the NRA and Torsion. The article is an attachment to this document.

[REDACTED] Some of Simpson's staff believe the NRA spent an abnormally large amount of money during the election, possibly indicating Russian involvement, but others in his company disagree.

[REDACTED] The New York Times story from October 3, 2016, that downplayed the connection between Alfa Bank servers and the Trump campaign was incorrect. There was communication and it wasn't spam. Mikhail Fridman lied in the written statement that he gave to the New York Times and Washington Post. Fridman claimed he never met Trump, however there are pictures to the contrary.

[REDACTED] Simpson received a bizarre tip on December 9 that the initial impetus to look at Anthony Weiner's computer came from FGI [REDACTED]. Simpson is not sure whether to believe this.

[REDACTED] Simpson still thinks Sergei Millian is a key figure connecting Trump to Russia. Looking at Millian led Simpson's company to Cohen. Simpson would be surprised if Millian was still in the U.S. Simpson believes Millian is an SVR officer, however he is deducing this from Millian's alias, not because he was told Millian was SVR. Millian may have overseen many financial transfers from Russia to assist the Trump campaign.

[REDACTED] Simpson asked STEELE [REDACTED] to speak to the Mother Jones reporter as it was Simpson's Hail Mary attempt.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr, On 12/12/2016, Page 3 of 3

[REDACTED] OHR asked Simpson if he was concerned about his personal safety. Simpson responded that he learned from his Russian investigative reporting what they were capable of but there was no way for him to know if they were coming after him. Simpson mentioned that someone called and asked him to find out where all of the Alfa Bank stories were coming from. Simpson did not state this was a threat from the Russians, but that was the impression made upon OHR based upon the timing of the comment and using that story as a response to OHR's question.

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 12/27/2016**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] On December 20, 2016, at 11:00 A.M. OHR provided writer with an 8GB SanDisk Cruiser Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive). Glen Simpson at Fusion GPS hired OHR's wife, Nellie Ohr, to conduct research for his firm. OHR voluntarily provided his wife's research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with the thumb drive and indicated it contained the totality of the work Nellie Ohr conducted for Simpson, but the Fusion GPS header was stripped. Nellie Ohr is a Russian linguist/analyst and a former Russian History professor. The thumb drive was entered into evidence.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/20/2016 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 97F-HQ-2063661-NY Date drafted 12/20/2016by Joe Pientka III

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000615

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Collected Item Log**

Event Title: [REDACTED] Nellie Ohr research for **Date:** 12/20/2016
Fusion GPS

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: Joe Pientka III

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661 [REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

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Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Collected From: [REDACTED] Associate Deputy Attorney General
and Director of the Department of Justice's
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF) Bruce Ohr
DOJ

Receipt Given?: No

Holding Office: WASHINGTON FIELD

Details:

On December 20, 2016, at 11:00 A.M. Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB)
[REDACTED] [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and
Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Nellie Ohr research for Fusion GPS
Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 12/20/2016

Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) provided writer with an 8GB SanDisk Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive).

[REDACTED] Glen Simpson at Fusion GPS hired OHR's wife, Nellie Ohr, to conduct research for his firm. OHR voluntarily provided his wife's research to the FBI. OHR provided the interviewing Agent with the thumb drive and indicated it contained the totality of the work Nellie Ohr conducted for Simpson, but the Fusion GPS header was stripped. Nellie Ohr is a Russian linguist/analyst and a former Russian History professor.

Item Type	Description
1B Digital	[REDACTED] 8GB SanDisk Cruzer Glide USB micro digital data storage drive (thumb drive) Collected On: 12/20/2016 11:00 AM EST Seizing Individual: Joe Pientka III Collected By: Joe Pientka III Location Area: FBIHQ Specific Location: Room 5853 Device Type: USB Micro Storage Device (thumb drive) Make: SanDisk Data Capacity: 8 GB Designation: Original Number of Devices Collected: 1

◆◆

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 01/31/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] On January 20, 2017, OHR received an e-mail from Glen Simpson asking OHR to contact Simpson. OHR subsequently contacted Simpson telephonically. During the telephonic conversation, Simpson told OHR that one of Christopher Steele's employees has been identified and will likely be publicly named by the media within the next couple of days. Simpson did not know the identity or contact information of the employee, only that the employee was intimately involved in compiling the information contained within the dossier on Donald J. Trump and the Trump campaign. Due to the sensitive nature of the employee's work and contacts, revealing the identity of the employee could place the employee in danger. Simpson was considering putting the employee in contact with an attorney to advise the employee. When OHR asked for more information regarding the employee and the nature of the threat, Simpson replied he would contact Steele for more information and then re-contact OHR.

[REDACTED] In the early hours of January 21, 2017, OHR received a text message from Steele which OHR did not notice until later in the morning. Around 8:00 am on the same day, OHR received call from Steele. During this conversation Steele relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 01/23/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 01/25/2017by [REDACTED]

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000618

97F-HQ-2063661-NY

[REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr 23


Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] January 2017 On 01/23/2017 Page 2 of 2

~~employee if the employee's name was released in the media. Steele stated if~~
the employee's name was released, the employee "may need help quickly."
Steele has been unable to directly contact the employee but observed a recent Facebook posting from the employee, indicating the employee was alright. When asked for the employee's identity, Steele replied that he did not have the employee's permission to share the information, but if contact was needed, a British female, not affiliated with the British Government, whom Steele identified as "FH" and was known to both Steel and OHR could arrange contact. Steele believed the employee, who resided in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, would be scared if the US Government contacted the employee; the employee's natural inclination would be to 'lay low.'

[REDACTED] In addition to the publication of the employee's name, an individual Steele identified as "SM" was about to be exposed (NFI) in the public which would also lead to the employee being identified. SM was someone from whom the employee obtained information, the nature of which was singular and thus traceable back to the employee.

[REDACTED] Steele also told OHR that he spoke with a staff member of Senator John McCain's office sometime prior to October 2016. Steele had this conversation at the request of Anthony Wood. Since October 2016, Steele had not spoken to anyone regarding the Trump dossier.

[REDACTED] OHR took notes during the contact with Simpson and Steele to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 01/27/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] On January 24, 2017, OHR received a WhatsApp notification from Christopher Steele. On January 25, 2017, Steele contacted and spoke with OHR via WhatsApp. During this conversation, Steele again relayed his concerns regarding the safety of his employee. Due to the possibility of the employee's identity being exposed by the media, the employee had 'went to ground' but recently 'semi-emerged' (NFI) indicating Steele could establish contact. Steele's concern was exacerbated by additional media reporting on "SM." SM was someone from whom the employee obtained information, the nature of which was singular and thus traceable back to the employee. Steele commented that SM had been previously mentioned in the media, "FT" (presumed by OHR to be the Financial Times) during the summer of 2016. Steele re-iterated to OHR the employee was an "absolute gem." Steele would attempt contact with the employee on 26 January 2017 to "see where he is." After Steele spoke with the employee, Steele would re-contact OHR.


[REDACTED] OHR took notes during the contact with Steele to preserve his memory and referred to them during the interview. OHR's notes are an attachment to this document.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 01/25/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 01/25/2017by [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 01/27/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] On January 27, 2017, OHR received a WhatsApp notification from Christopher Steele indicating Steele's employee was alright and Steele would like to keep the line of communication open with OHR for future contact. OHR replied in the affirmative.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 01/27/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 01/27/2017by [REDACTED]

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000621

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 02/08/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] OHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, via WhatsApp, on January 31, 2017. On January 30, 2017, the Trump Administration fired Acting Attorney General Sally Q. Yates and Steele had contacted OHR to determine if OHR anticipated being fired as well and, if so, who in the Department of Justice could he continue to reach out to. OHR added that he had previously explained to Steele at some point, his contact with the U.S. Government would have to involve the FBI. Interviewing agents asked OHR to ask Steele if he would be comfortable getting the name of an FBI agent.

[REDACTED] OHR advised Kathleen Kavalec, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State would be meeting with French representatives in order to discuss potential Russian influence in their upcoming Presidential elections. OHR reminded the interviewing agents Kavalec did speak with Steele several times prior to the 2016 US Presidential election and believed Steele's reporting to have generated from mainly one source.

[REDACTED] OHR also advised Adam Waldman, an attorney representing Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska, explained his client felt as if his productive conversations with OGA [REDACTED] were recently complicated by the FBI, who he

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 02/06/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 02/08/2017by [REDACTED]

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000622


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Interview of Bruce Ohr 06

Continuation of FD-302 of February 2017 On 02/06/2017 Page 2 of 2
~~felt viewed him as a criminal. Waldman informed OHR that Deripaska would~~
like to 'clean things up' and felt the circumstances surrounding the 2016
US Presidential election had become 'too emotional.' OHR stated, as he
understood it, Deripaska was informed of what was required during the FBI
interview.

[REDACTED] OHR stated Waldman also discussed WikiLeaks founder Julian
Assange's proffer with DOJ in order to obtain safe passage to the United
States. In return, Assange would (1) be willing to step down from his role
at WikiLeaks, (2) disclose his newest information to the U.S. Government
and accept recommendations for redactions, and (3) discuss the information
obtained from the cyber intrusion of the Democratic National Committee.
According to Waldman, Assange still refuses to identify his source, but is
frustrated the Russian Federation is getting credit for the intrusion. OHR
added that proffer request had been passed do DOJ National Security
Division.

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 02/15/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] OHR stated he had been contacted by Christopher Steele, via WhatsApp and OHR responded via FaceTime on 02/11/2017.

[REDACTED] Steele advised OHR that his contact was still doing well and he was going to continue to monitor his situation. If it helped to identify the contact, OHR added he has a five year old daughter, who is a U.S. Citizen.

[REDACTED] Steele's company is continuing to work for both Paul Hausser, another attorney for Oleg Deripaska, and German client, Bilfinger. However, OHR explained Steele is beginning to worry about his business and was preparing a report on Edward Snowden to broker a business relationship with the FBI. Steele advised OHR, 'You may see me re-emerge in a couple of weeks.'

[REDACTED] OHR responded he had yet to ask Steele if he would like to be provided with an FBI contact.

[REDACTED] OHR also advised Steele's family was doing fine, but were still a bit "freaked out." However, it seemed to Steele that things were calming down and he was pleased about a recent CNN article that stated U.S.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 02/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 97F-HQ-2067749, 97F-NY-2067747,File # [REDACTED] Date drafted 02/15/2017by [REDACTED]


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FBI-HJC119-CH-000624

[REDACTED]
97F-HQ-2063661-NY

[REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr 14

Continuation of FD-302 of February 2017 On 02/14/2017 Page 2 of 2
~~Government investigations had confirmed some of the reporting in his~~
dossier.

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 04/04/2017**DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL**

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[REDACTED] Bruce OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) was interviewed at FBI Headquarters, 935 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Special Agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] OHR stated he had recently been contacted by Christopher Steele on three separate occasions via WhatsApp or FaceTime. On 12 March 2017, Steele told OHR he was concerned about receiving a letter from Senator Grassley asking Steele to disclose additional details regarding the dossier Steele compiled on Donald J. Trump. Steele also expressed concern about the well-being of one of his previous employees who was instrumental in obtaining the information published in the dossier.

[REDACTED] On 15 March 2017, Steele told OHR if asked, Steele would tell the investigating congressional committees what he could about the dossier, but Steele must protect the sources and methods used to collect the information.

[REDACTED] On 26 March 2017, Steele told OHR he expected a letter from the congressional committee investigation at any moment. Steele was aware that Glen Simpson has already revived such a letter. Steele further told OHR that Adam Waldman, an attorney representing Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska, was acting in an informal capacity with Senator Mark Warner's staff, and was in contact with Steele. Steele noted since he resided in

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 03/27 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 97F-HQ-2063661Date drafted 04/03/2017

by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

97F-HQ-2063661

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr 27 03/27
March 2017 /2017 Page 2 of 2
the United Kingdom and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; Steele would answer
written questions from investigators only after receiving approval FGI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 05/10/2017

[REDACTED] On 5/8/2017, SA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] interviewed BRUCE OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] OHR and STEELE communicated via text message in WhatsApp and arranged a call for 5/3/2017 at 8:00 AM. STEELE told OHR that business was good.

[REDACTED] STEELE had been worried about Director Comey's upcoming testimony to congress, especially his response to questions that would be raised by Representative Grassley. STEELE was specifically concerned about anything Director Comey would say that might expose a sensitive source. STEELE was happy with Director Comey's response.

[REDACTED] In a previous conversation, STEELE had expressed concern for the well-being of a source. STEELE described the current disposition of this source as "stable".

[REDACTED] STEELE informed OHR that the disclosure laws in the UK were more narrow than in the United States and therefore limited his ability to testify before Congress. FGI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DAN JONES was a former FBI employee and had been on the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee. At the time of the interview, JONES was working with the DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE PROJECT and was still in touch with the FBI.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 05/08/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 97F-HQ-2063661Date drafted 05/08/2017

by [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

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FBI-HJC119-CH-000628

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Interview of Bruce Ohr 8 May 05/08
2017, On /2017, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED] GLENN SIMPSON of FUSION-GPS and JONES would be visiting STEELE soon and were in the process of "lawyering up" (NFI).

[REDACTED] JONATHAN WINER was bringing over a letter separately (NFI).

[REDACTED] STEELE was interested in working with the FBI and had additional information if the FBI was interested.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 05/12/2017

[REDACTED] On 5/12/2017, SA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] interviewed BRUCE OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp some time around Tuesday and they set up a call via WhatsApp for Wednesday 2:00 PM EST.

[REDACTED] Over the course of their telephone call, STEELE informed OHR that he had received a letter from the Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC). The letter requested answers to the following questions:

1. Had STEELE provided information to the US Government?
2. What was the scope of STEELE's investigation?
3. Did STEELE have any additional information to provide?

[REDACTED] STEELE mentioned that SIC was considering sending staffers to the UK.

[REDACTED] SSA [REDACTED] requested that OHR ask STEELE if he would be willing to have a conversation with FBI agents in the UK. OHR agreed to pass along the message.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 05/12/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # 97F-HQ-2063661 Date drafted 05/12/2017

by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 05/16/2017

[REDACTED] On 5/15/2017, SA [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] interviewed BRUCE OHR, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] currently the Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) at FBI Washington Field Office, 601 4th Street, Washington, DC. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, OHR provided the following information:

[REDACTED] CHRISTOPHER STEELE sent OHR a text message in WhatsApp on or around Friday, 5/12/2017. The two set up a call via WhatsApp for Saturday at 9:00 AM EST.

[REDACTED] Per FBI's previous request, OHR asked STEELE if he would be willing to meet with FBI agents. STEELE responded that the answer was an immediate yes but that he would need to check with his business partner and FGI [REDACTED] OHR was clear that this would be nothing more than a conversation with the FBI and STEELE said that would be alright.

[REDACTED] STEELE informed OHR that he had information regarding a conversation between Le Pen and Putin.

[REDACTED] STEELE contacted OHR via Whatsapp at 9:45 AM on Monday, 5/15/2017. STEELE said that his wife and his business partner were both ok with him talking to the FBI.

[REDACTED] SSA [REDACTED] told OHR that he would communicate with headquarters regarding FBI agents meeting with STEELE and let him know when he received a response.

Reason: [REDACTED]**Derived From:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]**Declassify On:** [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 05/15/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # 97F-HQ-2063661Date drafted 05/15/2017

by [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

TAB 11



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican
Candidate for U.S. President

Date: 08/30/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI1

Contact: Joe Pientka III, [REDACTED]

Approved By: KEVIN E. CLINESMITH
STRZOK PETER P II

Drafted By: Joe Pientka III

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

97F-NY-2069860

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE RAZOR
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

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program manager.

Synopsis: [REDACTED] This communication documents writer's
counterintelligence and security briefing to the Republican candidate
for U.S. President Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie
and General (retired) Michael Flynn.

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Full Investigation Initiated: 07/31/2016

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/30/2016

1. [REDACTED] Outline of brief given on 08/17/2016

Details:

On August 17, 2016, writer, provided a counterintelligence and security briefing to U.S. Presidential Candidate Donald J. Trump, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and retired General Michael Flynn. The brief was held at the FBI's New York Field Office in the TS/SCI SCIF conference room (west side) on the 25th floor and was in support of ODNI briefings provided to U.S. Presidential candidates and two of their advisors.

[REDACTED] Writer's brief lasted approximately thirteen minutes, starting at 1555 and ending at 1608. Upon entering the room Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all of the briefers. Trump, Christie and Flynn sat with their backs to the clocks facing the windows while the briefers sat across from them. An ODNI briefer, [REDACTED], initiated the briefing by discussing the history of the briefings and establishing the ground rules regarding the brief, specifically that the briefers would not answer policy related questions and would not discuss any operations. [REDACTED] then introduced writer, who provided the following brief (not verbatim, this is a summary):

(U [REDACTED]) Good afternoon gentlemen and welcome to the FBI's New York Field Office. My name is Joe Pientka and I'm a Supervisory Special Agent of a Foreign Counterintelligence Squad at the FBI's Washington Field Office. Prior to you receiving the classified presentations from the ODNI briefers, I will provide you with a counterintelligence and security brief that will give you a baseline on the methodology used by Foreign Intelligence Services to the detriment of U.S. National Security. In addition, this brief will advise you that if you are not already a target of a Foreign Intelligence Service, due to the fact you are receiving this classified briefing, you will be. Foreign Intelligence Services want information pertaining to political,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/30/2016

economic, energy, technology and military policy/plans of the U.S. This information is extremely valuable to our trusted allies. Putting it plainly, Foreign Intelligence Services look to collect inside information to give their country a competitive advantage over the U.S.

(U [REDACTED]) Before I speak to the methodology on how Foreign Intelligence Services collect this information, I should lay out their presence here in the United States. Foreign Intelligence Services deploy intelligence collectors - known as Intelligence Officers or IOs in one of two ways. The first is through the official diplomatic presence at their embassies, consulates and establishments in the U.S. IOs are deployed using diplomatic cover. As an example, IOs will purport to be an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in fact their real position is an IO. The second method of deploying intelligence operatives to the U.S. is through non-official cover or NOCs. NOCs can be tourists, businessmen, students, whoever that are not affiliated with their government. This is the most difficult to detect as we would need some forehand knowledge regarding who or what to look for.

[REDACTED] Statistically speaking the FBI has approximately [REDACTED] cases on Known or Suspected Russian IOs posted to the US. We also have approximately [REDACTED] cases on Known or Suspected Chinese IOs - almost [REDACTED] of the Russian establishment presence. What is interesting about the two services is how they have different methodology regarding how they will collect intelligence. The Russians are more like us in the traditional sense where they rely on an establishment presence while the Chinese take a more asymmetrical approach.

[REDACTED] Trump asked the following question, "Joe, are the Russians bad? Because they have more numbers are they worse than the Chinese?" Writer responded by saying both countries are bad. The numbers of IOs present in the U.S. is not an indicator of the severity of the threat. Writer reminded Trump the Chinese asymmetrical presence in the U.S.

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/30/2016

could be ten times as large as the symmetrical presence, yet we would not know. In addition, the OCONUS cyber threat posed by 3PLA would also need to be considered when making comparisons.

[REDACTED] Flynn then asked writer, "How many Special Agents are in the FBI?" Writer told Flynn he thought over 10,000. Flynn stated, "You have 17,000." Flynn then asked writer, "How many HVE cases does the FBI have?" Writer stated the FBI has approximately [REDACTED] HVE cases, a statistic backed up by John Mulligan, Deputy Chief of the National Counterterrorism Center. Flynn then spoke to Trump and said, "See, they don't have enough resources to work the HVE threat and the IOs." Flynn then asked writer, "Is it worse now than during the Cold War?" Writer responded that the number of identified known and suspected IOs from hostile Foreign Intelligence Services posted in the U.S. are equal to or greater than during the Cold War.

(U [REDACTED]) Following that exchange, writer continued by stating, Foreign Intelligence Services collect intelligence in three ways: HUMINT or through Human Intelligence, SIGINT or Signals Intelligence and Cyber or through computer intrusions. In the classical sense, an IO will attempt to recruit an individual to tell him or her the things he or she wants to know. This is known as HUMINT. It is highly unlikely a Foreign Intelligence Service will attempt to recruit you, however you need to be mindful of the people on your periphery: your staff, domestic help, business associates, friends, etc. Those individuals may present more vulnerabilities or be more susceptible to an approach. Those individuals will also be targeted for recruitment due to their access to you. That does not mean IOs will not make a run at you. They will send their IOs in diplomatic cover, businessperson NOCs, as well as sources they have developed around you to elicit information and gain assessment on you.

(U [REDACTED] To better explain the methodology, I will combine SIGINT and Cyber operations. Foreign Intelligence Services rely on our dependency to communicate. In this day and age to communicate effectively we must

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/30/2016

communicate electronically, which is a vector for exploitation by a Foreign Intelligence Service. You should be mindful of your use of landline telephones, cellular telephones, e-mail and computer networks. As you are aware, discussions regarding classified information should only be held in a facility certified for classified discussions. Therefore, a Foreign Intelligence Service would not necessarily target you technically to gain access to the classified information you were briefed on, but you will be targeted for sensitive and personal information about you.

(U/[REDACTED]) At this time, Flynn interjected, "I did SIGINT." Writer responded that he could then appreciate what our country can do technically to exploit a Tier 1 target and we must extrapolate a Foreign Intelligence Service could do the same to us. Trump then stated, "Yes I understand its a dark time. Nothing is safe on computers anymore. We used to lock things in a safe in a room, now anyone can get in. My son is ten years old. He has a computer and we put a codeword on it. Within ten minutes he broke the codeword and we needed to put another one on the computer. Kids are genius."

(U/[REDACTED]) Writer followed up by stating, in addition, you should not only consider how you communicate but where you communicate sensitive or personal information. Foreign Intelligence Services will develop a pattern on where you hold private meetings or discussions. They will attempt to determine if the location is a meeting room, kitchen, bedroom, vehicle, etc. Once a pattern is established they will attempt to exploit that location technically.

(U/[REDACTED]) Pending any questions gentlemen, that's all I have. I will also remind you the FBI is working with your transition team to provide the team with a similar counterintelligence and security brief. Thank you for your time.

[REDACTED] Following SSA Pientka's briefing the following ODNI briefers presented classified briefings on topics where they are

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Title: [REDACTED] Document Brief to Republican Candidate for U.S. President

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661, 08/30/2016

subject matter experts:

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Manager for Iran (name withheld due to cover concerns)

[REDACTED]
During the ODNI briefs, writer actively listened for topics or questions regarding the Russian Federation. During Mulligan's brief, he stated the U.S. is the world leader in Counterterrorism. Trump then asked, "Russia too?" During a discussion regarding nuclear testing, Russia and China were brought up as cheating on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Trump asked, "Who's worse?" [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Trump and Christie turned toward each other and Christie commented, "I'm shocked."

(U [REDACTED]) Due to time constraints, not all ODNI briefers presented their material. At 1750 the briefing ended to allow the candidate to meet his plane at 1900. Trump, Christie and Flynn shook hands with all presenters and exited the SCIF at approximately 1751.

◆◆

(1A9)

Universal Case File Number 97F-HQ-2063661Field Office Acquiring Evidence HQSerial # of Originating Document 26Date Received 8/17/2016From JOE PIOTKA
(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By JOE PIOTKA
(Name of Special Agent)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ NoReceipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ NoTitle: CROSSFIRE HURRICANEReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview ofOUTLINE USED DURING TRUMP BRIEF ON8/17/2016

Intro

- ✓ ^{Before} Purpose – CI and Security brief give ^{materiality} Baseline on FIS threat to US National Security.
- ✓ Advise - if not already targeting, due to this briefing and access – you are
- ✓ FIS collect Political, economic, technological and military intelligence
- ✓ Basically they want inside information to give their country a competitive advantage over US.

- ✓ FIS use Intelligence Officers as their operatives or collectors in 2 ways
- ✓ Official Cover by using IOs under diplomatic cover at US based foreign establishments
- ✓ Non official cover (NOCS) – tourists, students, academics, business people
- ✓ In the US – Russian Fed has [REDACTED] known or suspected IOs, while China has [REDACTED]
- ✓ Russian threat is more traditional – establishment based IOs, while China takes an asymmetrical approach using NOCS.

- ✓ FIS will collect intel in **3 ways** – HUMINT, SIGINT or Cyber
- ✓ **HUMINT** – IO attempt to recruit a person to provide Intel
 - Highly unlikely FIS attempt to recruit you: Staff, Business associates, domestic help
 - However – will come at you to elicit information – diplomats or NOCS
 - Classified, Sensitive, Private information
- ✓ **SIGINT & CYBER** – FIS rely on our **dependency to communicate** electronically & look to exploit.

- Mindful landline, cell calls, email, computer networks
- Mindful not only how you communicate but where
- Insider Threat – enable FIS technical penetrations

CHINA June 2015 OPM

SF-86

CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION

CUS Control Verification SPS

3PLA

2011

INDICT 5 CHINESE

STATE TRADE SECRETS

CHINESE COMPANIES

US STEEL

Korean
NORM
TED
JUN
AMR

BURYAKOV - Russian Banker
NOC

Vneshconbank

Parabnyy - Rion
Spokystev

2.5 PARS MAY

PLA INDICTMENT ^{CYBER} INTRUSION

TIGHT BIND - Econ-Bankers

IBIS -

OPM HACK - Chinese phone/PCs
SF 86?

OCAMUS



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Defensive Brief to David Kendall. **Date:** 10/22/2015

CC: Charles F. McGonigal
Coult W. Markovsky

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
MURPHY JOSHUA J

[REDACTED]
VOIRET DONALD M

From: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
D5-CD2

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: David W Archey

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: [REDACTED] (U) BLIND EYE
(U//FOUO) CLEAR SIGN;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)

Synopsis: [REDACTED] To document defensive briefing to David E. Kendall and his associate Katherine Turner, both of Williams & Connolly LLP, personal attorneys to Hillary Clinton.

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Full Investigation Initiated: 11/25/2014

Details:

[REDACTED] On Thursday, 15 October, SC David W. Archey and ASC Luis A. Perez-Miranda, met at FBIHQ, Room 5885, with David E. Kendall and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Defensive Brief to David Kendall.
Re: [REDACTED], 10/22/2015

Katherine Turner, both partners at Williams & Connolly LLP, located at 725 12th Street, N.W., Washington, DC. Kendall and Turner are personal attorneys for former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Kendall and Turner both hold security clearances. The purpose of the meeting was to provide a classified defensive briefing for Mrs. Clinton's presidential campaign, as summarized below:

[REDACTED] Kendall and Turner were advised the FBI has information that the Government of Turkey is attempting to influence Hillary Clinton through lobbying efforts and campaign contributions. The campaign contributions may come in a form outside established parameters for such contributions.

(U/[REDACTED]) Kendall and Turner were advised the FBI was providing them with this briefing for awareness and so Ms. Clinton could take appropriate action to protect herself. They were also told the FBI was seeking their assistance to identify other appropriate recipients of the brief, if any.

[REDACTED] Kendall and Turner were asked to advise the FBI, Section Chief Archey, if Ms. Clinton is approached by anyone connected to or acting at the direction of the Government of Turkey.

(U/[REDACTED]) As examples of issues that were known to be potentially important to the Government of Turkey, Kendall and Turner were advised of the following:

- a) The removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad;
- b) The implementation of a no-fly zone over Syria;
- c) U.S. support of Syrian rebels;
- d) U.S. military and material support to Kurdish groups fighting ISIL;
- e) Linking Turkey to the Armenian genocide.

[REDACTED] As a take away from the meeting, SC Archey offered that the campaign should increase its vigilance of contributions related to any of the matters discussed above.

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Defensive Brief to David Kendall.
Re: [REDACTED], 10/22/2015

[REDACTED] Kendall and Turner were advised the FBI has an ongoing investigation and does not have further information at this time. SC Archey stated the FBI felt the information was sufficiently reliable and serious that the FBI had a duty to warn.

[REDACTED] Kendall asked if that was all the information that could be shared, and SC Archey responded in the affirmative. Kendall advised he would reflect on the information and advise if he thought further defensive briefings were warranted. He mentioned the possibility, the legal counsel for the campaign, as well as the campaign financial manager might be appropriate persons to receive the brief. Kendall and Turner did not provide the names of these persons.

♦♦

TAB 12



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] US Department of State
employees aware of FBI relationship with
CROWN.

Date: 11/16/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI1

Contact: Joe Pientka III, [REDACTED]

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: Joe Pientka III

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

97F-NY-2067747

[REDACTED] SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE DRAGON
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: [REDACTED] This communication documents to the file two
email strings regarding US Department of State employees aware of FBI
relationship with CROWN.



Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] US Department of State employees aware of FBI
relationship with CROWN
2. [REDACTED] Victoria Nuland inquires about Rome meeting

Details:

This communication documents to the file two email strings regarding US
Department of State (USDOS) employees aware of FBI relationship with



[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] US Department of State employees aware of FBI relationship with CROWN.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/16/2016

CROWN. The first string of emails documents that USDOS employees were not only aware of the FBI's relationship with CROWN, the name of the Special Agent handler in Rome, the CHS' company name, but also knew of the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team's planned travel to Rome on October 3 to meet with CROWN. In addition, it also appears an unnamed USDOS employee may have been in Rome and met with CROWN, who is a friend or an acquaintance and took notes during the CROWN meeting. The notes were not provided to the FBI as the USDOS employee believes CROWN already passed the FBI this information.

The second string documents that following the FBI's meeting with CROWN on October 3, 2016, Kathy Kavalec, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs, acting on behalf of Victoria "Toria" Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European Affairs, requested an update from CD-1 Section Chief Steve Laycock regarding the FBI's meeting with CROWN.

◆◆

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2019 10:55 AM
To: PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED] -- [REDACTED]

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]
Below is what I was able to find in my emails.

Additionally, I remember that Pete or Joe had an idea of who the DOS employee was that met with the Orbis employee so I ran that person's name by Kathy and she all but confirmed that it was the same person who had provided his handwritten notes to Nuland. I don't remember ever getting these notes from Nuland or Kathy.

Thanks
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 11:24 AM
To: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI) <JDMARASCO [REDACTED]>; LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI) <SCLAYCOCK [REDACTED]>; MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI) <JCMOFFA [REDACTED]>; PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI) <JPIENKA [REDACTED]>; STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI) <PPSTRZOK [REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Hi,
Just spoke with Kathy Kavalec (Russia DAS, reports directly to Tora) and reiterated the urgency of getting this report. She is going to ask Tora again and relay the urgency.

Kathy provided some background on the report, which are actually notes taken by a DOS employee. It sounds like the employee may have been in Rome and met with the Orbis Security source who is a friend or an acquaintance. The DOS employee wrote notes during their meeting and came back to State and gave a copy to Tora. The DOS employee did not feel comfortable sharing these notes with the FBI (potentially just because they didn't feel they should be used for

anything official) and said that it sounded like the Orbis source had already provided the info to the FBI. The DOS employee also knew that the FBI was flying to Rome to meet with the Orbis source next week.

Toria has the notes, I haven't seen them and wasn't told about the content. Toria, as of yesterday, didn't feel comfortable passing them to us based on the request from the DOS employee that they not be shared. I'm guessing Toria will readdress with the DOS employee after my meeting with Kathy so I'll let you know what I hear back.

Thanks
[REDACTED]

From: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:49 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Copy. You know how much of a priority this is, so any information real-time is greatly appreciated by the CD FO. We have folks deploying to Rome to interview this guy. They are looking for all they can get....specifically, the original document. Thanks, Joe

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:43 AM
To: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

I don't really have the details on the report or where it came from because I wasn't in the discussions between Steve/Toria/Kathy, but when I went up to Kathy's office last night to get the report she said she did not know if they could get it cleared but that they would try to give us the POC who could get us the report or information.

The email she sent below is that follow up. I can certainly follow up with Kathy to see about the report, if needed.
Thanks
[REDACTED]

From: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:30 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED]

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:26 AM

To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Didn't Tora say she had gotten something tangible (a written report) via the Ambo from the source?

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)

Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:07 AM

To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)

Subject: FW: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Here is the info I mentioned yesterday. Summary below. Let me know if you need anything more. But I think that is all they had.

Steve

From: Kavalec, Kathleen A. OGA [REDACTED]

Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2016 6:36 PM

To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)

Subject: Follow-up

Hi Steve,

Thanks for coming over today. Regarding the issue we discussed at the end of our meeting, Toria inquired and was told the source of the information, from Orbis Security, is planning to meet on Monday, October 3, with Mike Gaeta, who she was told is your Legal Attache in Rome. This source also said some folks from FBI are flying out to Rome to meet him. Apparently the source and Gaeta know each other from New York.

I hope that is helpful in putting the pieces together!

Best, Kathy

Kathy Kavalec
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

OGA [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2016 7:10 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Update? --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

All good, I hit her back with it 'went well' and you the team had everything they needed.

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2016 5:00 PM
To: PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Update? --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

I agree with Joe. "We had a collegial meeting. Given our investigative responsibilities, we don't feel appropriate to get into the substance of the conversation." If she still pushes, he can just say he needs to take it back to HQ, let me know, and we'll figure out how to address.

Thanks

From: PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2016 8:29 AM
To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Update? --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Steve,

I'd be interested in [REDACTED] response to you. From Friday's meeting with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] we came to the conclusion that first and foremost the source's security is most important and we should never disclose our relationship regardless of if the CHS disclosed the relationship. As you know, the CH Team and ALAT Gaeta fully admonished the CHS that we have a confidential relationship so we shouldn't have any more loose lips. The idea from Friday's meeting was to have [REDACTED]

remain engaged with Kathleen and Toria as a sounding board in a non-committal way as he would hear if the CHS wasn't keeping up his end of the confidential relationship bargain.

I also don't know how its State's business or how they think it appropriate to ask about a potential FBI source meet on such a politically charged subject. That is sending flags up.

I think [REDACTED] will have the best approach and idea on how to give a non-committal answer. Obviously she knows we had a team travel through eCC and the source's admission, but I don't think we owe her any type of read-out and a political appointee should know better than to ask about a potential investigation of a political rival. I think we leave it at – a meeting occurred, the FBI collected information. I defer to [REDACTED] for his sense on how to handle the situation.

Regards,

Joe

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2016 8:10 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Update? --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Any feedback we can provide, even if generic in nature?

From: Kavalec, Kathleen A. OGA [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2016 8:07 AM
To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Update?

Steve,

Toria is back from Moscow and just asked me how the meeting in Rome went earlier this week. Is there anything you can share? Happy to talk secure if that would be convenient. Best, Kathy

Kathy Kavalec
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Sensitive
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 6:44 PM
To: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (FBI); LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Letter Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

I think that's enough info. If we need more, we can always go and informally talk to the State employee. This was as much for source vetting purposes as anything else

From: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 1:45 PM
To: [REDACTED] LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Letter Follow-up --- [REDACTED]
Importance: High

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Copy. Thanks, [REDACTED]

I'll let DAD Strzok and SSA Pientka comment further if needed, as this may have just answered our questions.

Thanks, Joe

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 11:24 AM
To: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI); LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI); STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

Hi,

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Kathy provided some background on the report, which are actually notes taken by a DOS employee. It sounds like the employee may have been in Rome and met with the Orbis Security source who is a friend or an acquaintance. The DOS employee wrote notes during their meeting and came back to State and gave a copy to Toria. The DOS employee did not feel comfortable sharing these notes with the FBI (potentially just because they didn't feel they should be used for anything official) and said that it sounded like the Orbis source had already provided the info to the FBI. The DOS employee also knew that the FBI was flying to Rome to meet with the Orbis source next week.

Toria has the notes, I haven't seen them and wasn't told about the content. Toria, as of yesterday, didn't feel comfortable passing them to us based on the request from the DOS employee that they not be shared. I'm guessing Toria will readdress with the DOS employee after my meeting with Kathy so I'll let you know what I hear back.

Thanks

[REDACTED]

From: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:49 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====
Copy. You know how much of a priority this is, so any information real-time is greatly appreciated by the CD FO. We have folks deploying to Rome to interview this guy. They are looking for all they can get....specifically, the original document. Thanks, Joe

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:43 AM
To: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====
I don't really have the details on the report or where it came from because I wasn't in the discussions between Steve/Toria/Kathy, but when I went up to Kathy's office last night to get the report she said she did not know if they could get it cleared but that they would try to give us the POC who could get us the report or information.

The email she sent below is that follow up. I can certainly follow up with Kathy to see about the report, if needed.

Thanks

From: MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:30 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:26 AM
To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Cc: MOFFA, JONATHAN C. (CD) (FBI); MARASCO, JOSEPH D. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

Didn't Toria say she had gotten something tangible (a written report) via the Ambo from the source?

From: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, September 30, 2016 10:07 AM
To: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI); PIENKA, JOE (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

TRANSITORY RECORD

Here is the info I mentioned yesterday. Summary below. Let me know if you need anything more. But I think that is all they had.

Steve

From: Kavalec, Kathleen A OGA
Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2016 6:36 PM
To: LAYCOCK, STEPHEN C. (CD) (FBI)
Subject: Follow-up

Hi Steve,

Thanks for coming over today. Regarding the issue we discussed at the end of our meeting, Toria inquired and was told the source of the information, from Orbis Security, is planning to meet on Monday, October 3, with Mike Gaeta, who she was told is your Legal Attache in Rome. This source also said some folks from FBI are flying out to Rome to meet him. Apparently the source and Gaeta know each other from New York.

I hope that is helpful in putting the pieces together!

Best, Kathy

Kathy Kavalec
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

OGA
[Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]

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Classification: [Redacted]



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: [REDACTED] Document U.S. State Department receiving CROWN information, however not provided by the FBI.

Date: 11/23/2016

From: WASHINGTON FIELD
WF-CI1

Contact: Joe Pientka III, [REDACTED]

Approved By: Joe Pientka III

Drafted By: Joe Pientka III

Case ID #: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY

[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE HURRICANE;
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;

97F-NY-2067747

[REDACTED] SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
[REDACTED] CROSSFIRE DRAGON
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not disseminate outside the FBI without the permission of the originator or program manager.

Synopsis: [REDACTED] This communication documents an email exchange showing the U.S. State Department is receiving CROWN information, however it is not being provided by the FBI.

[REDACTED]

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:

1. [REDACTED] Email exchange showing the U.S. State Department is receiving CROWN information, however it is not being provided by the FBI.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Title: [REDACTED] Document U.S. State Department receiving CROWN information, however not provided by the FBI.

Re: 97F-HQ-2063661-NY, 11/23/2016

Details:

This communication documents an email exchange showing the U.S. State Department is receiving CROWN information, however it is not being provided by the FBI nor has the FBI received it from CROWN to date. The email exchange also shows that Jon Winer was the unnamed (as of November 18, 2016) U.S. State Department employee who is in contact with CROWN and receiving his/her reporting.

◆◆

TAB 13

[REDACTED]
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONDate of entry 11/09/2017**DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS**

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U/ [REDACTED]) On Monday, 30 October 2017, JAMES ANTHONY WOLFE, date of birth [REDACTED], home address [REDACTED], was interviewed at Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Headquarters (FBIHQ), room 5382, by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED]. Also, present during the interview was Unit Chief [REDACTED]. WOLFE was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents.

(U/ [REDACTED]) Before interviewing agents provided the nature of the interview, WOLFE asked if he was under FBI investigation. WOLFE then provided the following information:

(U/ [REDACTED]) WOLFE is the Director of Security at the United States (US) Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and has been employed there for thirty (30) years. WOLFE's office is located in the US SSCI Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) room SH211 at the Hart Senate building. There is a "large conference room", located inside the SSCI SCIF. Closed hearing briefings are conducted in the SSCI SCIF in SH219. SH219 and SH211 are rooms where SSCI members are briefed by Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI and other US Intelligence Community (USIC) about Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Visitors to the SSCI SCIF are required to have their agency pass their security clearance to WOLFE prior to being allowed into the SSCI SCIF.

[REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] asked WOLFE if he was familiar with an article published by the Washington Post on 11 April 2017, which disclosed the FBI had a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) on CARTER PAGE. WOLFE

Reason: 1.4(c)**Derived From: FBI NSIC dated
20120629****Declassify On: 20411231**
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 10/30/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)File # 332A-WF-2221136-302Date drafted 10/30/2017by [REDACTED]

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332A-WF-2221136-302

(U/ [REDACTED]) Interview of James Wolfe on 30
Continuation of FD-302 of Oc [REDACTED] 2017, On 10/30/2017, Page 2 of 3

acknowledged he was aware of the FISA, herein after referred to as "FISA", and may have saved communications regarding it being couriered to SSCI and briefed in the SSCI SCIF room SH211. WOLFE initially learned about the FISA through DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) SAM RAMER by either telephone or email. WOLFE stated he would review his emails and provide dates of contact with RAMER regarding the information.

(U//FOUO) WOLFE asked interviewing agents if there was an investigation into the media leak. [Agent's note: Interviewing agents did not provide WOLFE a response, but continued the conversation.] WOLFE stated he had not reviewed the FISA.

([REDACTED]) WOLFE stated BENJAMIN "BEN" MAY couriered the FISA on 17 March 2017 to SSCI. The FISA was reviewed by Senator, House Permanent Intelligence Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), and their Staff Directors inside the SSCI SCIF room SH211. All visitors to the SSCI SCIF would have had to sign in and out of the Visitor Log Book. As a standard protocol there should have been documentation on who handled and reviewed the FISA. Specifically, since the FISA was a "Read and Return" MAY would have maintained custody of the FISA at all times. SSCI Members and Staffers reviewing the FISA would have been monitored by MAY. Members and Staffers should not have been allowed to take notes on the FISA; however, WOLFE was unaware if any of them did take notes.

([REDACTED]) Once classified documents were received by WOLFE's Security office, they were logged in a SSCI secured database referred to as the "Document Registry System". Only limited identifiers of the information were entered into the SSCI secured database. For example, if the document was "Read and Return" only the title of the document along with dates, author(s) and USIC agency would have been identified in the secured SSCI database. The document itself would not have been scanned into the system since it was a "Read and Return". WOLFE stated only SSCI Members and Staffers have access to the secured SSCI database. WOLFE is able to control access of which SSCI Members and Staffers are authorized to print documents from the secured database.

(U/ [REDACTED]) WOLFE stated, currently there are six SSCI members on the SSCI Russian Investigation Team. WOLFE believed those members would have had access to the FISA.

(U/ [REDACTED]) WOLFE's Assistant is NICOLETTE LOUELLEN and his Information Technology Staffer is OLIVER GALLOWAY. LOUELLEN and GALLOWAY did not have access to the FISA.

332A-WF-2221136-302

(U/ [REDACTED]) Interview of James Wolfe on 30
Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] Oct 2017 , On 10/30/2017 , Page 3 of 3

(U/ [REDACTED]) WOLFE opined HPSCI Security Office would follow the same procedures as SSCI Security Office regarding MAY providing access to HPSCI Members and Staffers to the FISA. The HPSCI Director of Security is KRISTIN JEPSON. WOLFE opined, RAMER would have contacted JEPSON regarding MAY providing access to the FISA to HPSCI Members and Staffers.

(U/ [REDACTED]) SSCI Security Office used to be in charge of maintaining all security clearances and access to classified information for all Senators and Staffers. In the 1990s, WOLFE helped to create the Secretary of the Senate. The Secretary of the Senate was established to take over the duties for managing all Senators and Staffers clearances and access to classified information. When the Secretary of the Senate was established, SSCI Security Office handled from that point on the security clearances and access to classified information for only SSCI Members and Staffers. The Director of Secretary of the Senate is MICHAEL DISILVESTRO, telephone number [REDACTED]. DISILVESTRO is in charge of the Senate Visitor Center SCIF.

(U/ [REDACTED]) WOLFE stated the Office of Senate Security (OSS) Sergeant of Arms oversees the security for the Senate, to include, Capital Police. FRANK LARKEN is the OSS Sergeant of Arms, and his office is located inside the basement of the Senate Visitor Center, room SVC217.

(U/ [REDACTED]) There has been a greater presence of media outside the SSCI SCIF due to coverage of the Russia investigation. WOLFE has instructed members of the media not to point their cameras facing the SSCI SCIF door because they were recording SSCI Members and Staffers entering and leaving. WOLFE stated one of the tactics "young reporters" use to gain information to report is to follow known SSCI Members and Staffers in the Hart Building hallway and discreetly listen or record their conversations.

(U/ [REDACTED]) At the end of the interview SA [REDACTED] left the room, WOLFE asked SA [REDACTED] for the full name of SA [REDACTED]. WOLFE wrote it on a note card. When SA [REDACTED] returned to the room WOLFE asked her if she had any social media accounts.

(U/ [REDACTED]) The interviewing agents' notes are maintained in a physical and digital 1A.



UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 01/03/2018

DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS

This document contains information that is restricted to case participants.

(U) On or about December 8, 2017 at approximately 8:42 a.m., Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] sent JAMES A. WOLFE an email at J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov which stated: "Sir, I hope all is well. I am in need of your assistance again and would like to meet next week. I was able to speak with Ben May and have a few additional questions. Lastly, I was wondering if you were able to locate the SCIF sign-in logs from March 17? If so, could you bring those to the meeting. Please give me a call your convenience to discuss further."

(U) On or about December 8, 2017 at approximately 9:10 a.m., WOLFE responded to SA [REDACTED]: "[REDACTED] - I'm on travel today and tomorrow, but I'll be in the office on Monday. Can I give you a call when I get situated Monday morning? Sent from my iPhone"

(U) On or about December 11, 2017 at approximately 12:45 p.m., SA [REDACTED] responded to WOLFE: "Sir, I hope you had a good trip this weekend. When you have a chance today would you mind giving me a call at [REDACTED] [REDACTED]? Thanks, [REDACTED]"

(U) On or about December 12, 2017 at approximately 10:27 a.m., SA [REDACTED] called WOLFE's work cellular number [REDACTED] and there was no answer. WOLFE's voicemail activated and was full. SA [REDACTED] was unable to leave a voice message.

(U) On or about December 12, 2017 at approximately 10:28 a.m., SA [REDACTED] called WOLFE's work landline number [REDACTED] and there was no answer. The voice mail activated and SA [REDACTED] left a voice message for WOLFE to return her call or contact SA [REDACTED].

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 8:20 a.m., WOLFE responded to SA [REDACTED]: "[REDACTED] - Thanks for your patience. I have a big event this morning, but I'll check in with you around mid-morning."

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Investigation on 12/14/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (Phone, Email)

File # 332A-WF-2221136-302

Date drafted 12/16/2017

by [REDACTED]

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332A-WF-2221136-302

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) JAMES A. WOLFE, On 12/14/2017, Page 2 of 2

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 5:55 p.m., SA [REDACTED] responded to WOLFE: "Sir, I hope your day went well. If possible I really need to speak with you for less then 5 minutes. Would you mind giving me a call tonight? My cell phone number is [REDACTED]. Thanks, [REDACTED]"

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 5:59 p.m., WOLFE responded to SA [REDACTED]: "I'm still with DJT Jr. Sent from my iPhone"

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 6:09 p.m., SA [REDACTED] responded to WOLFE: "Understandable. Please feel free to call whenever you are free. Thanks, [REDACTED]"

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 7:26 p.m., WOLFE responded to SA [REDACTED]: "Tomorrow morning okay?"

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 7:26 p.m., SA [REDACTED] responded to WOLFE: "Tomorrow morning is fine. Have a good night."

(U) On or about December 13, 2017 at approximately 7:33 p.m., WOLFE responded to SA [REDACTED]: "Roger."

(U) On or about December 14, 2017 at approximately 4:21 p.m., SA [REDACTED] responded to WOLFE: "Sir, I appreciate you keeping in touch with me considering everything going on over there this week. Sorry we didn't touch base this morning. With the Holidays coming up next weekend, I know we are running short on days. Are you available to meet Monday or Tuesday at 9:00am? I appreciate it is a busy time of year for all of us and I don't want to take any more of your time than needed. Thanks again, [REDACTED]"

(U) On or about December 14, 2017 at approximately 4:41 p.m., SA [REDACTED] received a telephone call on his Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) cell phone [REDACTED] from WOLFE, [REDACTED]. WOLFE agreed to meet with SA [REDACTED] at the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) on December 15, 2017 at 10:00 a.m.

(U) A copy of the unclassified emails are maintained in the 1A.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

FBI-HJC119-CH-000667

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2017 4:21 PM
To: 'Wolfe, J (Intelligence)'
Subject: RE: Follow-up

Sir,

I appreciate you keeping in touch with me considering everything going on over there this week. Sorry we didn't touch base this morning. With the Holidays coming up next weekend, I know we are running short on days. Are you available to meet Monday or Tuesday at 9:00am? I appreciate it is a busy time of year for all of us and I don't want to take any more of your time than needed.

Thanks again,
[REDACTED]

From: Wolfe, J (Intelligence) [mailto:J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 7:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Follow-up

Roger.

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 13, 2017, at 7:26 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Tomorrow morning is fine. Have a good night.

----- Original message -----

From: "Wolfe, J (Intelligence)" <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Date: 12/13/17 7:23 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up

Tomorrow morning okay?

James A. Wolfe
Director of Security
U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
Hart Senate Office Building, Room SH-211

Washington, DC 20510

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 6:09 PM
To: Wolfe, J (Intelligence) <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Subject: Re: Follow-up

Understandable. Please feel free to call whenever you are free.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

----- Original message -----

From: "Wolfe, J (Intelligence)" <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Date: 12/13/17 5:59 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Follow-up

I'm still with DJT Jr.

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 13, 2017, at 5:55 PM, [REDACTED] wrote:

Sir,

I hope your day went well. If possible I really need to speak with you for less than 5 minutes. Would you mind giving me a call tonight? My cell phone number is [REDACTED]

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

----- Original message -----

From: "Wolfe, J (Intelligence)" <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Date: 12/13/17 8:20 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Follow-up

[REDACTED] – Thanks for your patience. I have a big event this morning, but I'll check in with you around mid-morning.

James A. Wolfe
Director of Security
U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence
Hart Senate Office Building, Room SH-211
Washington, DC 20510
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 12:45 PM
To: Wolfe, J (Intelligence) <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Subject: Re: Follow-up

Sir,

I hope you had a good trip this weekend. When you have a chance today would you mind giving me a call at [REDACTED] ?

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

----- Original message -----

From: "Wolfe, J (Intelligence)" <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Date: 12/8/17 9:10 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: "Wolfe, J (Intelligence)" <J_Wolfe@ssci.senate.gov>
Subject: Re: Follow-up

[REDACTED] - I'm on travel today and tomorrow, but I'll be in the office on Monday. Can I give you a call when I get situated Monday morning?

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 8, 2017, at 8:42 AM, [REDACTED]
wrote:

Sir,

I hope all is well. I am in need of your assistance again and would like to meet next week. Preferably Monday or Tuesday if you are available. I was able to speak with Ben May and have a few additional questions. Lastly, I was wondering if you were able to locate the SCIF sign-in logs from March 17? If so, could you bring those to the meeting. Please give me a call your convenience

to discuss further.

Thank you.


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FBI Special Agent

[REDACTED]

TAB 15



[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 07/12/2017

Admiral Michael Rogers, Director, National Security Agency; and Commander, United States Cyber Command, was interviewed at National Security Agency (NSA) Headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland. Participating in the interview were FBI Special Agents (SAs) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] & [REDACTED], NSA General Counsel Glenn S. Gerstell, and Deputy Special Counsel Aaron M. Zebley. After being advised of the identities of the interviewers and the purpose of the interview, Gerstell advised he was participating in the interview in his capacity as the General Counsel for the NSA, not as personal counsel for ADM Rogers, given the substance of the interview related to ADM Rogers' interactions in his capacity as NSA Director. SA [REDACTED] advised ADM Rogers that it is a violation of criminal law to lie to the FBI in the course of an investigation, and ADM Rogers said he understood. ADM Rogers provided the following information:

Intelligence Community Assessment:

In January 2017, ADM Rogers participated in a meeting with President-Elect Donald Trump (P-E Trump) along with former Director of the FBI James Comey (Comey), former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper (Clapper), and former Director of Central Intelligence Agency John Brennan (Brennan). The purpose of the meeting was to brief P-E Trump about the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), and the assembled group agreed Comey should be the one to tell him about the contents of the "Steele dossier." ADM Rogers noted, by way of background, that in mid-December 2016, President Obama requested a single intelligence product on the topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election, with a deadline of the new year. The analytic work of the product was initiated as soon as the

Reason: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Investigation on 06/12/2017 at Fort Meade, Maryland, United States (In Person)File # 97F-WF-2167885Date drafted 06/15/2017

by [REDACTED]

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97F-WF-2167885

[REDACTED] Interview of Admiral Michael
Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers , On 06/12/2017 , Page 2 of 9

request was made, and an initial draft went to ADM Rogers sometime between Christmas and New Year's.

ADM Rogers decided that he would make the final analytic call on the NSA's input to the ICA, as he knew there would be a lot of pressure and attention on the final draft and he felt strongly his career analysts shouldn't have to be responsible for something under such political pressure. In one draft of the ICA, ADM Rogers noted the contents of the "Steele dossier" in the body of the product, which he did not recall seeing in previous drafts. In early January, the four Principals met and ADM Rogers told the group he was unclear why the ICA needed to focus on the dossier, as it was considered largely uncorroborated. Comey responded that the information was relevant, and ADM Rogers suggested the information be included in an annex or appendix, rather than prominently in the nearly one page summary he had seen.

FBI Investigation:

ADM Rogers has not been specifically briefed on the FBI investigation into the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and the nature of links between those efforts and the Trump campaign. However, ADM Rogers was aware the NSA has received Letterhead Memoranda (LHM) from the FBI requesting information, mostly on specific interactions with U.S. Persons (USPER). ADM Rogers was aware the FBI was "following specific individuals," but was not certain if it was because of the ongoing work on the ICA or for another reason.

ADM Rogers was surprised when Comey told the committee [the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] in open session on March 20, 2017 the FBI was investigating potential links between individuals associate with the Trump campaign and the Russian interference. He did not recall a prep session by the entire panel prior to the testimony, but said there might have been one, as it is common practice to conduct a prep when multiple seniors are before the same committee. In any case, Comey did not tell him in advance about the ongoing set of investigations.

ADM Rogers has no real insight into the facts and predication of the FBI investigation. As a matter of course, he does not look at all reporting, so it is standard for him not to know the specifics of all

97F-WF-2167885

[REDACTED] Interview of Admiral Michael
Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 3 of 9

reporting. Given the volume of reports generated by the NSA, it would be impossible for ADM Rogers to read all of it.

ADM Rogers knew the FBI was under a lot of pressure on the issue of Russian interference in the election, and had conducted a lot of briefings on the issue. ADM Rogers is aware of briefings to the Gang of 8, HPSCI, SSCI, President Obama, and P-E Trump. ADM Rogers noted he felt Comey had been treated very disrespectfully by some people on the Hill.

General Flynn:

ADM Rogers has never been briefed on the contents of a December 29, 2016 call between Mike Flynn and Sergey Kislyak and knows nothing more than what has been reported in the media. He is aware that NSA has shared certain information about Flynn with the FBI, but has never asked to review it. He has "intentionally stayed away from it" and is not aware of the details. ADM Rogers explained that when the NSA comes across USPER information, it is generally purged, unless it meets certain criteria. ADM Rogers described the criteria as 1) the collection pertains to criminal activity, at which time the FBI would be notified; 2) the collection involved harm to life; or 3) the collection was of foreign intelligence value. He noted that when an USPER ends up in NSA holdings it is generally because that person is on one end of a conversation the NSA is collecting on, or that person is mentioned in the course of another conversation. ADM Rogers is aware of at least one occasion the NSA collected data on Flynn, determined it didn't meet their criteria to maintain, and asked the FBI if the FBI had a FISA on Flynn. In accordance with their normal procedures, the NSA then purged that data.

ADM Rogers never talked to President Trump or anyone else from the White House about Comey, Flynn, or FBI investigations. ADM Rogers noted he is friends with Flynn, who he has known for 15 years, and spoke as the senior leader at Flynn's retirement ceremony.

March 26, 2017 telephone call with POTUS:

On Sunday, March 26, 2017, ADM Rogers and members of his staff were in the office working on the NSA response to requests from HPSCI and SSCI for information. ADM Rogers noted at least one of the requests pertained to Flynn and unmasking procedures. An early iteration of the response was

97F-WF-2167885

[REDACTED] Interview of Admiral Michael
Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers , On 06/12/2017 , Page 4 of 9

generated and found not to be to the standard required by ADM Rogers, so his staff continued to work while he left the building for a pre-scheduled brunch event with his family. Around 1:00 pm or 1:30 pm, he received a call from his staff in which he was told President Trump wanted to speak to him. ADM Rogers went to the office and placed the call to the White House. He made the decision to have his Deputy, Richard Ledgett, listen to the call, as it is his practice that "what I know, my Deputy knows."

Following the telephone call, Ledgett authored a memo on the content of the conversation. ADM Rogers thinks Ledgett probably started the memo right after a 4:00 pm meeting they had scheduled that afternoon to discuss the Hill requests they had been working on earlier in the day. The initial draft of the memo only had Ledgett's signature block, but after reading it, ADM Rogers asked Ledgett to add his signature block as well. ADM Rogers explained he felt the memo appropriate because getting a call from the President on a Sunday afternoon is a little unusual and he assumes that whatever he does will become public at some point, so he wanted to make sure it was captured accurately.

ADM Rogers provided the memo to the interview team, and Deputy Special Counsel Zebley read the memo out loud line-by-line, asking ADM Rogers at various points to confirm the content. According to ADM Rogers' recollection of the call and the memo, President Trump expressed frustration with the ongoing investigation into Russian interference, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult. ADM Rogers noted that when President Trump speaks, he tends to talk in long strings and it is not immediately clear what he expects to be answered and what is rhetorical. The President often doesn't pause for an answer before continuing to talk. During the call, President Trump disagreed with definitive assertions that the Russians were responsible for the hacks and said it was impossible to tell who was actually responsible for the hacking. He also said it was making it hard for him to deal with the Russians, and asked ADM Rogers what he thought. ADM Rogers acknowledged it does make relations difficult, but then explained in detail, but at a high level, the intelligence supporting ADM Rogers' confidence, and the rest of the community's, that the Russians were behind the hacks. President Trump stated they would have to "agree to disagree" on the matter. OGA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

97F-WF-2167885

[REDACTED] Interview of Admiral Michael

Continuation of FD-302 of Rogers, On 06/12/2017, Page 5 of 9

President Trump then asked ADM Rogers if he would say "that" publicly. ADM Rogers interpreted "that" to mean OGA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ADM Rogers told President Trump he could not do that, as he did not and could not discuss USPERs in unclassified settings. President Trump did not ask him to "pushback" on the investigation itself, but he clearly did not agree with the assessment of the Russian involvement. During the call, ADM Rogers said to President Trump, "You want me to be truthful, right?" President Trump never suggested otherwise, but said he wanted to make sure there was no doubt about his involvement. ADM Rogers affirmed the memo was a true and accurate reflection of the call. The interviewing team read to ADM Rogers a quote from a media source that stated "President Trump 'urged' [Rogers] to publicly deny the existence of any evidence of collusion during the 2016 election" and ADM Rogers responded that the media characterization was wrong, and the President had asked about the existence of SIGINT evidence only.

After the memo was drafted, ADM Rogers maintained the original of the memo, Ledgett kept a copy, and General Counsel Gerstell was given a copy. ADM Rogers agreed to provide the interviewing agents one of the copies of the memo. ADM Rogers later had Ledgett's copy couriered to the Pentagon to be shared with the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), explaining that he has dual chains of command and the SecDef is one of his bosses. He believes that copy to be currently in the possession of the Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff. ADM Rogers noted he was scheduled to speak with SSCI the evening of the interview, and planned to make another copy of the memo to leave with them as well.

The day after the call, ADM Rogers called DNI Coats and told him about the call and walked through the content of the discussion. DNI Coats responded that President Trump had called him and they had a similar conversation, but DNI Coats did not provide any guidance to ADM Rogers. ADM Rogers did not notify the Secretary of Defense immediately as the matter related to intelligence, not a military issue. He wouldn't raise the issue with his military leadership unless he was uncomfortable or there was a need to act.

ADM Rogers shared the content of the telephone call with the NSA Advisory Board, a group of individuals with whom ADM Rogers has regular

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contact and uses as a "sounding vehicle" for issues. ADM Rogers didn't read the memo to the Board, but he did tell them about it. There are no minutes or notes from their meetings, but he doesn't recall anyone saying the call was "terrible." He believes someone mentioned that the NSA should be careful not to be used politically. He agreed to provide the names of the individuals on the NSA Advisory Board to the interviewing agents after the interview.

ADM Rogers stated it was possible he discussed his conversation with President Trump with Comey or CIA Director Mike Pompeo, but he does not think he did.

ADM Rogers has never met White House Counsel Don McGahn. He has not discussed with Reince Priebus the Russian investigation. He was not asked by anyone at the White House to participate in any outreach to reporters or anyone else to refute the investigation.

ADM Rogers did not write a memo every time he met with or spoke to President Trump. He recalled a specific discussion in the Oval Office not related to the Russia investigation, in which the President wanted to talk about leaks, and a memo was not written afterward. That meeting, however, was not a one-on-one encounter as it included others, to include Reince Priebus, Tom Bossert, Glenn Gerstell, and George Barnes.

April 13, 2017 meeting with POTUS:

On April 13, 2017, ADM Rogers was at the White House to provide an overview of the NSA and its capabilities, at the request of DNI Coats. ADM Rogers noted DNI Coats had received a similar briefing and thought it would be helpful to provide that information to President Trump. Following the briefing, President Trump asked ADM Rogers to stay behind to have a private conversation. In that private conversation, the President repeated much of the same content discussed in the March 26, 2017 telephone call, but he didn't ask for anything or direct ADM Rogers to do anything. ADM Rogers described the conversation as President Trump "venting" and recalled President Trump saying something like the "Russia thing has got to go away." He also recalled President Trump saying something similar to "I have done nothing wrong." ADM Rogers responded that the quickest and best way to make the investigation end is to make sure the investigation

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[REDACTED]

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was done. ADM Rogers did not draft a memorandum for the record after the meeting.

ADM Rogers was asked if he felt any discomfort with the conversation. ADM Rogers' responded that his takeaway from the meeting was that he was dealing with a man who has been a businessman his entire life and doesn't know how government works and doesn't understand government processes.

ADM Rogers feels that he has a different type of relationship with President Trump than the President had with Comey. As an intelligence professional, he viewed President Trump as a "customer" and added that in his experience, some customers are harder to convince than others. In those cases, analysts sometimes have to go back and do more work to get them there.

June 7, 2017 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing:

Going into his June 7, 2017 testimony before SSCI, ADM Rogers knew the committee would ask questions about the media reports of his call with the President, based on his discussions with the SSCI Chairman and Vice Chairman prior to the hearing. Knowing the questions would be asked, NSA asked the White House prior to ADM Rogers' testimony about whether the White House would assert executive privilege, but NSA did not get a clear response to the question. ADM Rogers decided before the hearing that he couldn't discuss a classified conversation in an open hearing, so he would not disclose the content of the call. His answer was his own, and he felt no pressure from anyone to answer that way. Asked about his statement to the committee, "I have never been directed to do anything I believe to be illegal, immoral, unethical, or inappropriate," ADM Rogers said he did not coordinate the statement with DNI Coats, but he did tell him what he intended to say immediately prior to the hearing. ADM Rogers acknowledged DNI Coats's testimony was similar to ADM Rogers' when DNI Coats was asked about his own conversations with the President, but repeated they had not coordinated language before the hearing.

ADM Rogers closed by stating he believes the President truly believes the government will never really know who is responsible for the hacking incidents during the 2016 Presidential election and that he

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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himself has done nothing wrong. ADM Rogers noted he does not believe President Trump to be particularly convinced of the electronic surveillance capabilities in use by our adversaries, despite having been given a demonstration.

Administrative:

The General Counsel's copy of the memo documenting ADM Rogers' March 26, 2017 telephone call with President Trump was provided to the interviewing agents and will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file.

On June 15, 2017, Glenn Gerstell provided to Aaron Zebley via email the date of the executive session at which ADM Rogers told the members about his call with POTUS (April 13, 2017) and a list of the NSA Advisory Board members. A printout of that email will be maintained in the 1A section of the case file. The Board members include:

OGA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] (not present at the 4/13/2017
Advisory Board executive session)

[REDACTED]

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TAB 16

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 02/28/2017

(U/ [REDACTED]) On February 11, 2017, JOSEPH MIFSUD, date of birth (DOB) [REDACTED], Director, London Academy of Diplomacy, mobile telephone number [REDACTED], email address [REDACTED] was interviewed in the lobby of the Omni Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, NW, Washington, DC 20008. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, MIFSUD provided the following information:

(U/ [REDACTED]) MIFSUD lives in London and is the Director of the London Academy of Diplomacy, however, he is also an adviser at the London Centre of International Law Practice (LCILP). After reviewing a photograph provided by the interviewing agents, MIFSUD immediately identified the individual as GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS. PAPADOPOULOS is also a member of LCILP, however, MIFSUD first met him in Rome when PAPADOPOULOS traveled with his boss, NAGI IDRIS, to the Link Campus University in Rome approximately 8 months ago. The meeting had approximately 8 participants and was an informational exchange focused on organizing policy seminars and building a relationship between the University and LCILP.

(U/ [REDACTED]) Approximately two months later, MIFSUD met PAPADOPOULOS for the second time when the two had coffee in the UK during the period when PAPADOPOULOS was transitioning from LCILP to a position with the DONALD TRUMP campaign. In addition to MIFSUD and PAPADOPOULOS, OLGA POLENSKAYA, an MBA student from Link Campus University, was at the meeting. POLENSKAYA was in town to meet with IDRIS and MISFUD. There were no other persons, including foreign officials, present. MIFSUD did not believe POLENSKAYA was related to VLADIMIR PUTIN or any other Russian government officials. MIFSUD stated PAPADOPOULOS was interested in foreign policy ideas, TRUMP's recent speech, Israel, migration, Russia, and other geo political subjects. PAPADOPOULOS did not ask MIFSUD to join the TRUMP campaign during this conversation. MIFSUD described the meeting as happenstance. He was at LCILP and saw PAPADOPOULOS there, so they had lunch in the cafeteria,

Investigation on 02/10/2017 at Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)

File # 105H-CG-2132469 Date drafted 02/16/2017

by [REDACTED]

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followed by coffee at the hotel across from LCILP. During lunch POLENSKAYA and MARTIN Last Name Unknown were also present.

(U [REDACTED]) MIFSUD stated he had no advance knowledge Russia was in possession of emails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and, therefore, did not make any offers or proffer any information to PAPADOPOULOS. They spoke about cyber security and hacking as a larger issue. PAPADOPOULOS must have misunderstood their conversation.

(U [REDACTED]) MIFSUD believed PAPADOPOULOS and POLENSKAYA may have had a social engagement after the meeting. He also introduced PAPADOPOULOS to IVAN TIMOFEEV, who works at the Russian International Affairs Council, via email.

(U [REDACTED]) MIFSUD has not seen PAPADOPOULOS since the UK meeting. He emailed PAPADOPOULOS in December about meeting while MIFSUD was in the US, but he did not meet with him. On or about the same time, MIFSUD received an email from PAPADOPOULOS stating he had left the TRUMP campaign.

(U [REDACTED]) After the meeting, MIFSUD emailed one of the interviewing agents with additional information. The email, as well as the photo displayed to MIFSUD, are attached to this communication as a 1A.